In these areas, which
comprise at least seven-eighths of the United Kingdom, gas-masks should be
kept at home and only carried in the target areas as scheduled. There is
really no reason why orders to this effect should not be given during the
coming week.
* * * * *
The disasters which had occurred in Poland and the Baltic States made me all the more
anxious to keep Italy out of the war, and to build up by every possible means some
365
common interest between us. In the meantime the war went on, and I was busy over a
number of administrative matters.
In spite of having a full day's work usually here, I cannot help feeling
anxious about the Home Front. You know my views about the needless, and
in most parts of the country senseless, severities of these black-outs,
entertainment restrictions and the rest. But what about petrol? Have the
Navy failed to bring in the supplies? Are there not more supplies on the
water approaching and probably arriving than would have been ordered had
peace remained unbroken? I am told that very large numbers of people and
a large part of the business of the country is hampered by the stinting.
Surely the proper way to deal with this is to have a ration at the standard
price, and allow free purchasing, subject to a heavy tax, beyond it. People
will pay for locomotion, the revenue will benefit by the tax, more cars will
come out with registration fees, and the business of the country can go
forward.
Then look at these rations, all devised by the Ministry of Food to win the
war. By all means have rations, but I am told that the meat ration, for
instance, is very little better than that of Germany. Is there any need of this
when the seas are open?
If we have a heavy set-back from air attack or surface attack, it might be
necessary to inflict these severities. Up to the present there is no reason to
suppose that the Navy has failed in bringing in the supplies, or that it will
fail.
Then what about all these people of middle age, many of whom served in
the last war, who are full of vigour and experience, and who are being told
by tens of thousands that they are not wanted, and that there is nothing for
them except to register at the local Labour Exchange? Surely this is very
foolish. Why do we not form a Home Guard of half a million men over forty
(if they like to volunteer), and put all our elderly stars at the head and in the
structure of these new formations? Let these five hundred thousand men
come along and push the young and active out of all the home billets. If
uniforms are lacking, a brassard would suffice, and I am assured there are
plenty of rifles at any rate. I thought from what you said to me the other
day that you liked this idea. If so, let us make it work.
I hear continual complaints from every quarter of the lack of organisation on
First Lord to Home Secretary. 7.X.39.
366
the Home Front. Can't we get at it?
* * * * *
Amidst all these preoccupations there burst upon us suddenly an event which touched the
Admiralty in a most sensitive spot.
I have mentioned the alarm that a U-boat was inside Scapa Flow, which had driven the
Grand Fleet to sea on the night of October 17, 1914. That alarm was premature. Now, after
exactly a quarter of a century almost to a day, it came true. At 1.30 A.M. on October 14,
1939, a German U-boat braved the tides and currents, penetrated our defences, and sank
the battleship Royal Oak as she lay at anchor. At first, out of a salvo of torpedoes, only one
hit the bow and caused a muffled explosion. So incredible was it to the Admiral and Captain
on board that a torpedo could have struck them, safe in Scapa Flow, that they attributed
the explosions to some internal cause. Twenty minutes passed before the U-boat, for such
she was, had reloaded her tubes and fired a second salvo. Then three or four torpedoes
striking in quick succession ripped the bottom out of the ship. In less than two minutes, she
capsized and sank. Most of the men were at action stations, but the rate at which the ship
turned over made it almost impossible for anyone below to escape.
An account based on a German report written at the time may be recorded:
At 01.30 on October 14, 1939, H.M.S. Royal Oak, lying at anchor in
Scapa Flow, was torpedoed by U 47 (Lieutenant Prien). The
operation had been carefully planned by Admiral Doenitz himself,
the Flag Officer [submarineswas a clever planner, the third prince Wo Kuo Tai [Ogedaihas taken her case before the Court,
and she asks for justice there. If the Court finds that her case is just, but is
unable to offer any satisfaction, the Covenant of the League of Nations will
have been proved a fraud, and collective security a sham. If no means of
lawful redress can be offered to the aggrieved party, the whole doctrine of
international law and co-operation upon which the hopes of the future are
based would lapse ignominiously. It would be replaced immediately by a
system of alliances and groups of nations deprived of all guarantees but
their own right arm. On the other hand, if the League of Nations were able
to enforce its decree upon one of the most powerful countries in the world
found to be an aggressor, then the authority of the League would be set
upon so majestic a pedestal that it must henceforth be the accepted
sovereign authority by which all the quarrels of people can be determined
and controlled. Thus we might upon this occasion reach by one single bound
the realisation of our most cherished dreams.
But the risk! No one must ignore it. How can it be minimised? There is a
simple method: the assembly of an overwhelming force, moral and physical,
in support of international law. If the relative strengths are narrowly
balanced, war may break out in a few weeks, and no one can measure what
the course of war may be, or who will be drawn into its whirlpools, or how, if
ever, they will emerge. But if the forces at the disposal of the League of
Nations are four or five times as strong as those which the aggressor can as
yet command, the chances of a peaceful and friendly solution are very good.
Therefore, every nation, great or small, should play its part according to the
Covenant of the League.
Upon what force can the League of Nations count at this cardinal moment?
Has she sheriffs and constables with whom to sustain her judgments, or is
she left alone, impotent, a hollow mockery amid the lip-serving platitudes of
irresolute or cynical devotees? Strangely enough for the destiny of the
world, there was never a moment or occasion when the League of Nations
could command such overwhelming force. The constabulary of the world is
at hand. On every side of Geneva stand great nations, armed and ready,
whose interests as well as whose obligations bind them to uphold, and in the
last resort enforce, the public law. This may never come to pass again. The
fateful moment has arrived for choice between the New Age and the Old.
All this language was agreeable to the Liberal and Labour forces with whom I and several
of my Conservative friends were at this time working. It united Conservatives alarmed
about national safety with trade-unionists, with Liberals, and with the immense body of
peace-minded men and women who had signed the Peace Ballot of a year before. There is
no doubt that had His Majesty's Government chosen to act with firmness and resolve
155
through the League of Nations, they could have led a united Britain forward on a final quest
to avert war.
* * * * *
The violation of the Rhineland was not debated till March 26. The interval was partly filled
by a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in London. As the result, Germany
was invited to submit to the Hague Court her case against the Franco -Soviet Pact, about
which Hitler had complained, and to undertake not to increase her troops in the Rhineland
pending further negotiations. If Germany refused this latter request, the British and Italian
Governments undertook to carry out the steps entailed by their obligations under the
Treaty of Locarno. Not much value could be assigned to the Italian promise. Mussolini was
already in close contact with Hitler. Germany felt strong enough to decline any conditions
limiting her forces in the Rhineland. Mr. Eden, therefore, insisted that staff conversations
should take place between Great Britain, France, and Belgium to enable any joint action
which might at some future time become necessary under the Treaty of Locarno to be
studied and prepared in advance. The youthful Foreign Secretary made a courageous
speech, and carried the House with him. Sir Austen Chamberlain and I both spoke at length
in his support. The Cabinet was lukewarm, and it was no easy task for Eden even to
procure the institution of staff conversations. Usually such conversations do not play any
part as diplomatic counters, and take place secretly or even informally. Now they were the
only practical outcome of three weeks' parleyings and protestations, and the only Allied
reply to Hitler's breach of the Treaty and solid gain of the Rhineland.
In the course of my speech I said:
We cannot look back with much pleasure on our foreign policy in the last
five years. They certainly have been disastrous years. God forbid that I
should lay on the Government of my own country the charge of
responsibility for the evils which have come upon the world in that period.
But certainly we have seen the most depressing and alarming change in the
outlook of mankind which has ever taken place in so short a period. Five
years ago all felt safe; five years ago all were looking forward to peace, to a
period in which mankind would rejoice in the treasures which science can
spread to all classes if conditions of peace and justice prevail. Five years ago
to talk of war would have been regarded not only as a folly and a crime, but
almost as a sign of lunacy.
The violation of the Rhineland is serious because of the menace to which it
exposes Holland, Belgium, and France. I listened with apprehension to what
the Secretary of State said about the Germans declining even to refrain from
entrenching themselves during the period of negotiations. When there is a
line of fortifications, as I suppose there will be in a very short time, it will
produce reactions on the European situation. It will be a barrier across
156
Germany's front door which will leave her free to sally out eastwards and
southwards by the other doors.
The far-reaching consequences of the fortification of the Rhineland were only gradually
comprehended in Britain and the United States. On April 6, when the Government asked for
a vote of confidence in their foreign policy, I recurred to this subject:
Herr Hitler has torn up the Treaties and has garrisoned the Rhineland. His
troops are there, and there they are going to stay. All this means that the
Nazi regime has gained a new prestige in Germany and in all the
neighbouring countries. But more than that, Germany is now fortifying the
Rhine zone or is about to fortify it. No doubt it will take some time. We are
told that in the first instance only field entrenchments will be erected, but
those who know to what perfection the Germans can carry field
entrenchments, like the Hindenburg Line, with all the masses of concrete
and the underground chambers there included, will realise that field
entrenchments differ only in degree from permanent fortifications, and work
steadily up from the first cutting of the sods to their final and perfect form.
I do not doubt that the whole of the German frontier opposite to France is to
be fortified as strongly and as speedily as possible. Three, four, or six
months will certainly see a barrier of enormous strength. What will be the
diplomatic and strategic consequences of that? The creation of a line of forts
opposite to the French frontier will enable the German troops to be
economised on that line, and will enable the main forces to swing round
through Belgium and Holland. Then look East. There the consequences of
the Rhineland fortifications may be more immediate. That is to us a less
direct danger, but it is a more imminent danger. The moment those
fortifications are completed, and in proportion as they are completed, the
whole aspect of middle Europe is changed. The Baltic States, Poland and
Czechoslovakia, with which must be associated Yugoslavia, Rumania,
Austria, and some other countries, are all affected very decisively the
moment that this great work of construction has been completed,
Every word of this warning was successively and swiftly proved true.
* * * * *
After the occupation of the Rhineland and the development of the line of fortifications
against France, the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich was evidently to be the
next step. The story that had opened with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss in July, 1934,
had soon another and a consequential chapter to unfold. With illuminating candour, as we
now know, the German Foreign Minister Neurath told the American Ambassador in Moscow,
Mr. Bullitt, on May 18, 1936, that it was the policy of the German Government to do
157
nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland had been digested. He explained that
until the German defences had been built on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German
Government would do everything to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the
Nazis in Austria, and that they would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ?As
soon as our fortifications are constructed,? he said, ?and the countries in Central Europe
realise that France cannot enter German territory, all these countries will begin to feel very
differently about their foreign policies, and a new constellation will develop.? Neurath
further informed Mr. Bullitt that the youth of Austria was turning more and more towards
the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a
question of time. But the governing factor was the completion of the German fortifications
on the French frontier, for otherwise a German quarrel with Italy might lead to a French
attack on Germany.
On May 21, 1936, Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag declared that ?Germany neither
intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to
conclude an Anschluss.? On July 11, 1936, he signed a pact with the Austrian Government
agreeing not to influence in any way the internal affairs of Austria, and especially not to
give any active support to the Austrian National-Socialist Movement. Within five days of this
agreement secret instructions were sent to the National-Socialist Party in Austria to extend
and intensify their activities. Meanwhile, the German General Staff under Hitler's orders
were set to draw up military plans for the occupation of Austria when the hour should
strike.
158
The Foreign Policy of England ? The New Dominator ? The League of Nations ? Two Years'
Interlude ? My Memorandum on Supply Organisation, June 6, 1936 (Appendix) ? The
Civil War in Spain ? Non-Intervention ? The Anti-Comintern Pact ? Mr. Baldwin's
?Frankness? Speech ? Arms and the Covenant ? The Albert Hall Meeting ? The
Abdication of King Edward VIII ? Mr. Baldwin's Wisdom ? The Coronation of King George
VI ? A Letter from the King ? Mr. Baldwin's Retirement ? Mr. Chamberlain Prime Minister
? Ministerial Changes ? Baldwin and Chamberlain ? A Talk with Ribbentrop.
H ERE IS THE PLACE to set forth the principles of British policy towards Europe which I had
followed for many years and follow still. I cannot better express them than in the words
which I used to the Conservative Members Committee on Foreign Affairs, who invited me to
address them in private at the end of March, 1936.
For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the
strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and
particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a
Power. Viewed in the light of history, these four centuries of consistent
purpose amid so many changes of names and facts, of circumstances and
conditions, must rank as one of the most remarkable episodes which the
records of any race, nation, state, or people can show. Moreover, on all
occasions England took the more difficult course. Faced by Philip II of Spain,
against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon,
against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been
very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest.
However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong
Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated
the Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led.
Thus we preserved the liberties of Europe, protected the growth of its
vivacious and varied society, and emerged after four terrible struggles with
an ever-growing fame and widening Empire, and with the Low Countries
safely protected in their independence. Here is the wonderful unconscious
tradition of British foreign policy. All our thoughts rest in that tradition today.
I know of nothing which has occurred to alter or weaken the justice,
12
The Loaded Pause? Spain
1936? 1937
159
wisdom, valour, and prudence upon which our ancestors acted. I know of
nothing that has happened to human nature which in the slightest degree
alters the validity of their conclusions. I know of nothing in military, political,
economic, or scientific fact which makes me feel that we might not, or
cannot, march along the same road. I venture to put this very general
proposition before you because it seems to me that if it is accepted,
everything else becomes much more simple.
Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is
that seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is
Spain, or the French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German
Empire, or the Hitler regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is
concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating
tyrant. Therefore, we should not be afraid of being accused of being pro-
French or anti -German. If the circumstances were reversed, we could
equally be pro-German and anti-French. It is a law of public policy which we
are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental
circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment.
The question, therefore, arises which is today the Power in Europe which is
the strongest, and which seeks in a dangerous and oppressive sense to
dominate. Today, for this year, probably for part of 1937, the French Army is
the strongest in Europe. But no one is afraid of France. Everyone knows that
France wants to be let alone, and that with her it is only a case of self -
preservation. Everyone knows that the French are peaceful and overhung by
fear. They are at once brave, resolute, peace-loving, and weighed down by
anxiety. They are a liberal nation with free parliamentary institutions.
Germany, on the other hand, fears no one. She is arming in a manner which
has never been seen in German history. She is led by a handful of
triumphant desperadoes. The money is running short, discontents are arising
beneath these despotic rulers. Very soon they will have to choose, on the
one hand, between economic and financial collapse or internal upheaval,
and on the other, a war which could have no other object, and which, if
successful, can have no other result, than a Germanised Europe under Nazi
control. Therefore, it seems to me that all the old conditions present
themselves again, and that our national salvation depends upon our
gathering once again all the forces of Europe to contain, to restrain, and if
necessary to frustrate, German domination. For, believe me, if any of those
other Powers, Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, had with our
aid become the absolute masters of Europe, they could have despoiled us,
reduced us to insignificance and penury on the morrow of their victory. We
ought to set the life and endurance of the British Empire and the greatness
of this island very high in our duty, and not be led astray by illusions about
an ideal world, which only means that other and worse controls will step into
160
our place, and that the future direction will belong to them.
It is at this stage that the spacious conception and extremely vital
organisation of the League of Nations presents itself as a prime factor. The
League of Nations is, in a practical sense, a British conception, and it
harmonises perfectly with all our past methods and actions. Moreover, it
harmonises with those broad ideas of right and wrong, and of peace based
upon controlling the major aggressor, which we have always followed. We
wish for the reign of law and freedom among nations and within nations,
and it was for that, and nothing less than that, that those bygone architects
of our repute, magnitude, and civilisation fought, and won. The dream of a
reign of international law and of the settlement of disputes by patient
discussion, but still in accordance with what is lawful and just, is very dear
to the British people. You must not underrate the force which these ideals
exert upon the modern British democracy. One does not know how these
seeds are planted by the winds of the centuries in the hearts of the working
people. They are there, and just as strong as their love of liberty. We should
not neglect them, because they are the essence of the genius of this island.
Therefore, we believe that in the fostering and fortifying of the League of
Nations will be found the best means of defending our island security, as
well as maintaining grand universal causes with which we have very often
found our own interests in natural accord.
My three main propositions are: First, that we must oppose the would-be
dominator or potential aggressor. Secondly, that Germany under its present
Nazi regime and with its prodigious armaments, so swiftly developing, fills
unmistakably that part. Thirdly, that the League of Nations rallies many
countries, and unites our own people here at home in the most effective
way to control the would-be aggressor. I venture most respectfully to submit
these main themes to your consideration. Everything else will follow from
them.
It is always more easy to discover and proclaim general principles than to
apply them. First, we ought to count our effective association with France.
That does not mean that we should develop a needlessly hostile mood
against Germany. It is a part of our duty and our interest to keep the
temperature low between these two countries. We shall not have any
difficulty in this so far as France is concerned. Like us, they are a
parliamentary democracy with tremendous inhibitions against war, and, like
us, under considerable drawbacks in preparing their defence. Therefore, I
say we ought to regard our defensive association with France as
fundamental. Everything else must be viewed in proper subordination now
that the times have become so sharp and perilous. Those who are
possessed of a definite body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions
upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises
161
of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging
their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to
day. The first thing is to decide where you want to go. For myself, I am for
the armed League of all Nations, or as many as you can get, against the
potential aggressor, with England and France as the core of it. Let us neglect
nothing in our power to establish the great international framework. If that
should prove to be beyond our strength, or if it breaks down through the
weakness or wrong-doing of others, then at least let us make sure that
England and France, the two surviving free great countries of Europe, can
together ride out any storm that may blow with good and reasonable hopes
of once again coming safely into port.
If we add the United States to Britain and France; if we change the name of the potential
aggressor; if we substitute the United Nations Organisation for the League of Nations, the
Atlantic Ocean for the English Channel, and the world for Europe, the argument is not
necessarily without its application today.
* * * * *
Two whole years passed between Hitler's seizure of the Rhineland in March, 1936, and his
rape of Austria in March, 1938. This was a longer interval than I had expected. Everything
happened in the order foreseen and stated, but the spacing between the successive blows
was longer. During this period no time was wasted by Germany. The fortification of the
Rhineland, or ?The West Wall,? proceeded apace, and an immense line of permanent and
semi-permanent fortifications grew continually. The German Army, now on the full
methodical basis of compulsory service and reinforced by ardent volunteering, grew
stronger month by month, both in numbers and in the maturity and quality of its
formations. The German Air Force held and steadily improved the lead it had obtained over
Great Britain. The German munition plants were working at high pressure. The wheels
revolved and the hammers descended day and night in Germany, making its whole industry
an arsenal, and welding all its population into one disciplined war machine. At home in the
autumn of 1936, Hitler inaugurated a Four Years' Plan to reorganise German economy for
greater self-sufficiency in war. Abroad he obtained that ?strong alliance? which he had
stated in Mein Kampf would be necessary for Germany's foreign policy. He came to terms
with Mussolini, and the Rome-Berlin Axis was formed.
Up till the middle of 1936, Hitler's aggressive policy and treaty-breaking had rested, not
upon Germany's strength, but upon the disunion and timidity of France and Britain and the
isolation of the United States. Each of his preliminary steps had been gambles in which he
knew he could not afford to be seriously challenged. The seizure of the Rhineland and its
subsequent fortification was the greatest gamble of all. It had succeeded brilliantly. HIS
opponents were too irresolute to call his bluff. When next he moved in 1938, his bluff was
bluff no more. Aggression was backed by force, and it might well be by superior force.
When the Governments of France and Britain realised the terrible transformation which had
taken place, it was too late.
162
* * * * *
I continued to give the closest attention to our military preparations. My relations with Sir
Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, were friendly, and I did my best to
help him privately. At his request I wrote and sent him a memorandum about the muchneeded
Ministry of Supply, which is dated June 6, 1936.1 No effective action was, however,
taken to create a Ministry of Supply until the spring of 1939, nearly three years later, nor
was any attempt made to introduce emergency conditions into our munitions production.
* * * * *
At the end of July, 1936, the increasing degeneration of the parliamentary regime in Spain,
and the growing strength of the movements for a Communist, or alternatively an Anarchist,
revolution, led to a military revolt which had long been preparing. It is part of the
Communist doctrine and drillbook, laid down by Lenin himself, that Communists should aid
all movements towards the Left and help into office weak Constitutional, Radical, or
Socialist Governments. These they should undermine, and from their falling hands snatch
absolute power, and found the Marxist State. In fact, a perfect reproduction of the
Kerensky period in Russia was taking place in -Spain. But the strength of Spain had not
been shattered by foreign war. The Army still maintained a measure of cohesion. Side by
side with the Communist conspiracy there was elaborated in secret a deep military
counterplot. Neither side could claim with justice the title-deeds of legality, and Spaniards
of all classes were bound to consider the life of Spain.
Many of the ordinary guarantees of civilised society had been already liquidated by the
Communist pervasion of the decayed Parliamentary Government. Murders began on both
sides, and the Communist pestilence had reached a point where it could take political
opponents in the streets or from their beds and kill them. Already a large number of these
assassinations had taken place in and around Madrid. The climax was the murder of Se?or
Sotelo, the Conservative leader, who corresponded somewhat to the type of Sir Edward
Carson in British politics before the 1914 war. This crime was the signal for the generals of
the Army to act. General Franco had a month before written a letter to the Spanish War
Minister, making it clear that if the Spanish Government could not maintain the normal
securities of law in daily life, the Army would have to intervene. Spain had seen many
pronunciamientos by military chiefs in the past. When, after General Sanjurjo had perished
in an air crash, General Franco raised the standard of revolt, he was supported by the
Army, including the rank and file. The Church, with the noteworthy exception of the
Dominicans, and nearly all the elements of the Right and Centre, adhered to him, and he
became immediately the master of several important provinces. The Spanish sailors killed
their officers and joined what soon became the Communist side. In the collapse of civilised
Government, the Communist sect obtained control, and acted in accordance with their drill.
Bitter civil war now began. Wholesale cold-blooded massacres of their political opponents,
and of the well-to-do, were perpetrated by the Communists, who had seized power. These
were repaid with interest by the forces under Franco. All Spaniards went to their deaths
163
with remarkable composure, and great numbers on both sides were shot. The military
cadets defended their college at the Alcazar in Toledo with the utmost tenacity, and
Franco's troops, forcing their way up from the south, leaving a trail of vengeance behind
them in every Communist village, presently achieved their relief. This episode deserves the
notice of historians.
In this quarrel I was neutral. Naturally, I was not in favour of the Communists. How could I
be, when if I had been a Spaniard they would have murdered me and my family and
friends? I was sure, however, that with all the rest they had on their hands the British
Government were right to keep out of Spain. France proposed a plan of non-intervention,
whereby both sides would be left to fight it out without any external aid. The British,
German, Italian, and Russian Governments subscribed to this. In consequence, the Spanish
Government, now in the hands of the most extreme revolutionaries, found itself deprived of
the right even to buy the arms ordered with the gold it physically possessed. It would have
been more reasonable to follow the normal course, and to have recognised the belligerency
of both sides as was done in the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865. Instead, however,
the policy of non-intervention was adopted and formally agreed to by all the Great Powers.
This agreement was strictly observed by Great Britain; but Italy and Germany on the one
side, and Soviet Russia on the other, broke their engagement constantly and threw their
weight into the struggle one against the other. Germany in particular used her air power to
commit such experimental horrors as the bombing of the defenceless little township of
Guernica.
The Government of M. L?n Blum, which had succeeded the Flandin Ministry in May, was
under pressure from its Communist supporters in the Chamber to support the Spanish
Government with war material. The Air Minister, M. Cot, without too much regard for the
strength of the French air force, then in a state of decay, was secretly delivering planes and
equipment to the Republican armies. I was perturbed at such developments, and on July
31, 1936, I wrote to M. Corbin, the French Ambassador:
One of the greatest difficulties I meet with in trying to hold on to the old
position is the German talk that the anti -Communist countries should stand
together. I am sure if France sent airplanes, etc., to the present Madrid
Government, and the Germans and Italians pushed in from the other angle,
the dominant forces here would be pleased with Germany and Italy, and
estranged from France. I hope you will not mind my writing this, which I do,
of course, entirely on my own account. I do not like to hear people talking of
England, Germany, and Italy forming up against European Communism. It is
too easy to be good.
I am sure that an absolutely rigid neutrality, with the strongest protest
against any breach of it, is the only correct and safe course at the present
time. A day may come, if there is a stalemate, when the League of Nations
may intervene to wind up the horrors. But even that is very doubtful.
164
* * * * *
There is another event which must be recorded here. On November 25, 1936, the
Ambassadors of all the Powers represented in Berlin were summoned to the Foreign Office,
where Herr von Neurath disclosed the details of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which had been
negotiated with the Japanese Government. The purpose of the pact was to take common
action against the international activities of the Comintern, either within the boundaries of
the contracting states, or beyond them.
* * * * *
During the whole of 1936 the anxiety of the nation and Parliament continued to mount and
was concentrated in particular upon our air defences. In the debate on the Address on
November 12, I severely reproached Mr. Baldwin for having failed to keep his pledge that
?any Government of this country? a National Government more than any, and this
Government? will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be
in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores.? I said, ?The
Government simply cannot make up their minds, or they cannot get the Prime Minister to
make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided,
resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent. So
we go on preparing more months and years? precious, perhaps vital, to the greatness of
Britain? for the locusts to eat.?
Mr. Baldwin replied to me in a remarkable speech, in which he said:
I want to speak to the House with the utmost frankness. The
difference of opinion between Mr. Churchill and myself is in the
years 1933 onwards. In 1931/32, although it is not admitted by the
Opposition, there was a period of financial crisis. But there was
another reason. I would remind the House that not once but on
many occasions in speeches and in various places, when I have
been speaking and advocating as far as I am able the democratic
principle, I have stated that a democracy is always two years behind
the dictator. I believe that to be true. It has been true in this case. I
put before the whole House my own views with an appalling
frankness. You will remember at that time the Disarmament
Conference was sitting in Geneva. You will remember at that time
there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through this
country than at any time since the war. You will remember the
election at Fulham in the autumn of 1933, when a seat which the
National Government held was lost by about seven thousand votes
165
on no issue but the pacifist. My position as the leader of a great
party was not altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what
chance was there? when that feeling that was given expression to in
Fulham was common throughout the country? what chance was
there within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed
that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I
had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming, and
that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy
would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of
anything that would have made the loss of the election from my
point of view more certain.
This was indeed appalling frankness. It carried naked truth about his motives into
indecency. That a Prime Minister should avow that he had not done his duty in regard to
national safety because he was afraid of losing the election was an incident without parallel
in our parliamentary history. Mr. Baldwin was, of course, not moved by any ignoble wish to
remain in office. He was in fact in 1936 earnestly desirous of retiring. His policy was
dictated by the fear that if the Socialists came into power, even less would be done than
his Government intended. All their declarations and votes against defence measures are
upon record. But this was no complete defence, and less than justice to the spirit of the
British people. The success which had attended the naive confession of miscalculation in air
parity the previous year was not repeated on this occasion. The House was shocked.
Indeed the impression produced was so painful that it might well have been fatal to Mr.
Baldwin, who was also at that time in failing health, had not the unexpected intervened.
* * * * *
At this time there was a great drawing-together of men and women of all parties in
England who saw the perils of the future, and were resolute upon practical measures to
secure our safety and the cause of freedom, equally menaced by both the totalitarian
impulsions and our Government's complacency. Our plan was the most rapid large-scale
rearmament of Britain, combined with the complete acceptance and employment of the
authority of the League of Nations. I called this policy ?Arms and the Covenant.? Mr.
Baldwin's performance in the House of Commons was viewed among us all with disdain.
The culmination of this campaign was to be a meeting at the Albert Hall. Here on
December 3 we gathered many of the leading men in all the parties? strong Tories of the
Right Wing earnestly convinced of the national peril; the leaders of the League of Nations
Peace Ballot; the representatives of many great trade unions, including in the chair my old
opponent of the general strike, Sir Walter Citrine; the Liberal Party and its leader, Sir
Archibald Sinclair. We had the feeling that we were upon the threshold of not only gaining
respect for our views, but of making them dominant. It was at this moment that the King's
passion to marry the woman he loved caused the casting of all else into the background.
The abdication crisis was at hand.
166
Before I replied to the vote of thanks there was a cry, ?God Save the King?; and this
excited prolonged cheering. I explained, therefore, on the spur of the moment my personal
position.
There is another grave matter which overshadows our minds
tonight. In a few minutes we are going to sing ?God Save the King.?
I shall sing it with more heartfelt fervour than I have ever sung it in
my life. I hope and pray that no irrevocable decision will be taken in
haste, but that time and public opinion will be allowed to play their
part, and that a cherished and unique personality may not be
incontinently severed from the people he loves so well. I hope that
Parliament will be allowed to discharge its function in these high
constitutional questions. I trust that our King may be guided by the
opinions that are now for the first time being expressed by the
British nation and the British Empire, and that the British people will
not in their turn be found wanting in generous consideration for the
occupant of the Throne.
It is not relevant to this account to describe the brief but intensely violent controversy that
followed. I had known King Edward VIII since he was a child, and had in 1910 as Home
Secretary read out to a wonderful assembly the proclamation creating him Prince of Wales
at Carnarvon Castle. I felt bound to place my personal loyalty to him upon the highest
plane. Although during the summer I had been made fully aware of what was going
forward, I in no way interfered nor communicated with him at any time. However,
presently in his distress he asked the Prime Minister for permission to consult me. Mr.
Baldwin gave formal consent, and on this being conveyed to me, I went to the King at Fort
Belvedere. I remained in contact with him till his abdication, and did my utmost to plead
both to the King and to the public for patience and delay. I have never repented of this ?
indeed, I could do no other.
The Prime Minister proved himself to be a shrewd judge of British national feeling.
Undoubtedly he perceived and expressed the profound will of the nation. His deft and
skilful handling of the abdication issue raised him in a fortnight from the depths to the
pinnacle. There were several moments when I seemed to be entirely alone against a
wrathful House of Commons. I am not, when in action, unduly affected by hostile currents
of feeling; but it was on more than one occasion almost physically impossible to make
myself heard. All the forces I had gathered together on ?Arms and the Covenant,? of which
I conceived myself to be the mainspring, were estranged or dissolved, and I was myself so
smitten in public opinion that it was the almost universal view that my political life was at
last ended. How strange it is that this very House of Commons, which had regarded me
with so much hostility, should have been the same instrument which hearkened to my
guidance and upheld me through the long adverse years of war till victory over all our foes
167
was gained! What a proof is here offered that the only wise and safe course is to act from
day to day in accordance with what one's own conscience seems to decree I
From the abdication of one King we passed to the coronation of another, and until the end
of May, 1937, the ceremonial and pageantry of a solemn national act of allegiance and the
consecration of British loyalties at home and throughout the Empire to the new Sovereign
filled all minds. Foreign affairs and the state of our defences lost all claim upon the public
mood. Our island might have been ten thousand miles away from Europe. However, I am
permitted to record that on May 18, 1937, on the morrow of the Coronation, I received
from the new King, His present Majesty, a letter in his own handwriting:
The Royal Lodge,
The Great Park,
Windsor, Berks.
18.V.37
My dear Mr. Churchill,
I am writing to thank you for your very nice letter to me. I know how
devoted you have been, and still are, to my dear brother, and I feel touched
beyond words by your sympathy and understanding in the very difficult
problems that have arisen since he left us in December. I fully realise the
great responsibilities and cares that I have taken on as King, and I feel most
encouraged to receive your good wishes, as one of our great statesmen, and
from one who has served his country so faithfully. I can only hope and trust
that the good feeling and hope that exists in the Country and Empire now
will prove a good example to other nations in the world.
Believe me,
Yours very sincerely,
GEORGE R.I.
This gesture of magnanimity towards one whose influence at that time had fallen to zero
will ever be a cherished experience in my life.
* * * * *
On May 28, 1937, after King George VI had been crowned, Mr. Baldwin retired. His long
public services were suitably rewarded by an earldom and the Garter. He laid down the
wide authority he had gathered and carefully maintained, but had used as little as possible.
He departed in a glow of public gratitude and esteem. There was no doubt who his
successor should be. Mr. Neville Chamberlain had, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, not only
done the main work of the Government for five years past, but was the ablest and most
168
forceful Minister, with high abilities and an historic name. I had described him a year earlier
at Birmingham in Shakespeare's words as the ?pack-horse in our great affairs,? and he had
accepted this description as a compliment. I had no expectation that he would wish to work
with me; nor would he have been wise to do so at such a time. His ideas were far different
from mine on the treatment of the dominant issues of the day. But I welcomed the
accession to power of a live, competent, executive figure. While still Chancellor of the
Exchequer he had involved himself in a fiscal proposal for a small-scale national defence
contribution which had been ill-received by the Conservative Party and was, of course,
criticised by the Opposition. I was able, in the first days of his Premiership, to make a
speech upon this subject which helped him to withdraw, without any loss of dignity, from a
position which had become untenable. Our relations continued to be cool, easy, and polite
both in public and in private.
Mr. Chamberlain made few changes in the Government. He had had disagreements with
Mr. Duff Cooper about War Office Administration, and much surprised him by offering him
advancement to the great key office of the Admiralty. The Prime Minister evidently did not
know the eyes through which his new First Lord, whose early career had been in the
Foreign Office, viewed the European scene. In my turn I was astonished that Sir Samuel
Hoare, who had just secured a large expansion of the naval programme, should wish to
leave the Admiralty for the Home Office. Hoare seems to have believed that prison reform
in a broad humanitarian sense would become the prevailing topic in the immediate future;
and since his family was connected with the famous Elizabeth Fry, he had a strong personal
sentiment about it.
* * * * *
I may here set down a comparative appreciation of these two Prime Ministers, Baldwin and
Chamberlain, whom I had known so long and under whom I had served or was to serve.
Stanley Baldwin was the wiser, more comprehending personality, but without detailed
executive capacity. He was largely detached from foreign and military affairs. He knew little
of Europe, and disliked what he knew. He had a deep knowledge of British party politics,
and represented in a broad way some of the strengths and many of the infirmities of our
island race. He had fought five general elections as leader of the Conservative Party and
had won three of them. He had a genius for waiting upon events and an imperturbability
under adverse criticism. He was singularly adroit in letting events work for him, and
capable of seizing the ripe moment when it came. He seemed to me to revive the
impressions history gives us of Sir Robert Walpole, without, of course, the eighteenthcentury
corruption, and he was master of British politics for nearly as long.
Neville Chamberlain, on the other hand, was alert, businesslike, opinionated, and self -
confident in a very high degree. Unlike Baldwin, he conceived himself able to comprehend
the whole field of Europe, and indeed the world. Instead of a vague but none the less
deep-seated intuition, we had now a narrow, sharp -edged efficiency within the limits of the
policy in which he believed. Both as Chancellor of the Exchequer and as Prime Minister, he
kept the tightest and most rigid control upon military expenditure. He was throughout this
169
period the masterful opponent of all emergency measures. He had formed decided
judgments about all the political figures of the day, both at home and abroad, and felt
himself capable of dealing with them. His all-pervading hope was to go down to history as
the Great Peacemaker; and for this he was prepared to strive continually in the teeth of
facts, and face great risks for himself and his country. Unhappily, he ran into tides the force
of which he could not measure, and met hurricanes from which he did not flinch, but with
which he could not cope. In these closing years before the war, I should have found it
easier to work with Baldwin, as I knew him, than with Chamberlain; but neither of them
had any wish to work with me except in the last resort.
* * * * *
One day in 1937, I had a meeting with Herr von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador to
Britain. In one of my fortnightly articles I had noted that he had been misrepresented in
some speech he had made. I had, of course, met him several times in society. He now
asked me whether I would come to see him and have a talk. He received me in the large
upstairs room at the German Embassy. We had a conversation lasting for more than two
hours. Ribbentrop was most polite, and we ranged over the European scene, both in
respect of armaments and policy. The gist of his statement to me was that Germany sought
the friendship of England (on the Continent we are still often called ?England?). He said he
could have been Foreign Minister of Germany, but he had asked Hitler to let him come over
to London in order to make the full case for an Anglo-German entente or even alliance.
Germany would stand guard for the British Empire in all its greatness and extent. They
might ask for the return of the German colonies, but this was evidently not cardinal. What
was required was that Britain should give Germany a free hand in the East of Europe. She
must have her Lebensraum, or living-space, for her increasing population. Therefore,
Poland and the Danzig Corridor must be absorbed. White Russia and the Ukraine were
indispensable to the future life of the German Reich of more than seventy million souls.
Nothing less would suffice. All that was asked of the British Commonwealth and Empire was
not to interfere. There was a large map on the wall, and the Ambassador several times led
me to it to illustrate his projects.
After hearing all this, I said at once that I was sure the British Government would not agree
to give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe. It was true we were on bad terms with
Soviet Russia and that we hated Communism as much as Hitler did, but he might be sure
that, even if France were safeguarded, Great Britain would never disinterest herself in the
fortunes of the Continent to an extent which would enable Germany to gain the domination
of Central and Eastern Europe. We were actually standing before the map when I said this.
Ribbentrop turned abruptly away. He then said: ?In that case, war is inevitable. There is no
way out. The Fuehrer is resolved. Nothing will stop him and nothing will stop us.? We then
returned to our chairs. I was only a private Member of Parliament, but of some
prominence. I thought it right to say to the German Ambassador? in fact, I remember the
words well: ?When you talk of war, which, no doubt, would be general war, you must not
underrate England. She is a curious country, and few foreigners can understand her mind.
Do not judge by the attitude of the present Administration. Once a great cause is presented
170
to the people, all kinds of unexpected actions might be taken by this very Government and
by the British nation.? And I repeated: ?Do not underrate England. She is very clever. If you
plunge us all into another Great War, she will bring the whole world against you like last
time.? At this, the Ambassador rose in heat and said, ?Ah, England may be very clever, but
this time she will not bring the world against Germany.? We turned the conversation onto
easier lines, and nothing more of note occurred. The incident, however, remains in my
memory, and, as I reported it at the time to the Foreign Office, I feel it right to put it on
record.
When he was on his trial for his life by the conquerors, Ribbentrop gave a distorted version
of this conversation and claimed that I should be summoned as a witness. What I have set
down about it is what I should have said had I been called.
171
The ?Over-all Strategic Objective? ? German Expenditure on Armaments ? Independent
Inquiries ? The Conservative Deputation to the Prime Minister, July 28, 1936 ? My
Statement of the Case ? General Conclusions ? My Fear ? Our Second Meeting,
November 23, 1936 ? Lord Swinton Leaves the Air Ministry, May 12, 1938 ? Debate in
Parliament ? Lindemann Rejoins the Air Defence Research Committee ? My
Correspondence with M. Daladier ? The French Estimate of German Air Strength, 1938 ?
My Estimate of the German Army, June, 1938 ? M. Daladier Concurs ? The Decay of the
French Air Force ? The Careless Islanders.
A DVANTAGE IS GAINED in war and also in foreign policy and other things by selecting from
many attractive or unpleasant alternatives the dominating point. American military thought
had coined the expression ?Over-all Strategic Objective.? When our officers first heard this,
they laughed; but later on its wisdom became apparent and accepted. Evidently this should
be the rule, and other great business be set in subordinate relationship to it. Failure to
adhere to this simple principle produces confusion and futility of action, and nearly always
makes things much worse later on.
Personally I had no difficulty in conforming to the rule long before I heard it proclaimed. My
mind was obsessed by the impression of the terrific Germany I had seen and felt in action
during the years of 1914 to 1918 suddenly becoming again possessed of all her martial
power, while the Allies, who had so narrowly survived, gaped idle and bewildered.
Therefore, I continued by every means and on every occasion to use what influence I had
with the House of Commons and also with individual Ministers to urge forward our military
preparations and to procure allies and associates for what would before long become again
the Common Cause.
One day a friend of mine in a high confidential position under the Government came over
to Chartwell to swim with me in my pool when the sun shone bright and the water was
fairly warm. We talked of nothing but the coming war, of the certainty of which he was not
entirely convinced. As I saw him off, he suddenly on an impulse turned and said to me,
?The Germans are spending a thousand million pounds sterling a year on their armaments.?
I thought Parliament and the British public ought to know the facts. I, therefore, set to
work to examine German finance. Budgets were produced and still published every year in
Germany; but from their wealth of figures it was very difficult to tell what was happening.
13
Germany Armed
1936? 1938
172
However, in April, 1936, I privately instituted two separate lines of scrutiny. The first rested
upon two German refugees of high ability and inflexible purpose. They understood all the
details of the presentment of German budgets, the value of the mark, and so forth. At the
same time I asked my friend, Sir Henry Strakosch, whether he could not find out what was
actually happening. Strakosch was the head of the firm called ?Union Corporation,? with
great resources, and a highly skilled, devoted personnel. The brains of this City company
were turned for several weeks onto the problem. Presently they reported with precise and
lengthy detail that the German war expenditure was certainly round about a thousand
million pounds sterling a year. At the same time the German refugees, by a totally different
series of arguments, arrived independently at the same conclusion. One thousand million
pounds sterling per annum at the money values of 1936!
I had, therefore, two separate structures of fact on which to base a public assertion. So I
accosted Mr. Neville Chamberlain, still Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the lobby the day
before a debate and said to him, ?Tomorrow I shall ask you whether it is not a fact that the
Germans are spending a thousand million pounds a year on warlike preparations, and I
shall ask you to confirm or deny.? Chamberlain said: ?I cannot deny it, and if you put the
point I shall confirm it.? I must quote my words:
Taking the figures from German official sources, the expenditure on
capital account, from the end of March, 1933, to the end of June,
1935, has been as follows: in 1933 nearly five milliards of marks; in
1934 nearly eight milliards; and in 1935 nearly eleven milliards? a
total of twenty-four milliards, or roughly two thousand million
pounds. Look at these figures, five, eight, and eleven for the three
years. They give you exactly the kind of progression which a
properly developing munitions industry would make.
Specifically I asked the Chancellor:
Whether he is aware that the expenditure by Germany upon purposes
directly and indirectly concerned with military preparations, including
strategic roads, may well have amounted to the equivalent of eight hundred
million pounds, during the calendar year 1935; and whether this rate of
expenditure seems to be continuing in the current calendar year.
Mr. Chamberlain: The Government have no official figures, but from such
information as they have, I see no reason to think that the figure mentioned
in my right hon. friend's question is necessarily excessive as applied to either
year, although, as he himself would agree, there are elements of conjecture.
I substituted the figure of eight hundred million for one thousand million pounds to cover
my secret information, and also to be on the safe side.
173
* * * * *
I sought by several means to bring the relative state of British and German armaments to a
clear -cut issue. I asked for a debate in secret session. This was refused. ?It would cause
needless alarm.? I got little support. All secret sessions are unpopular with the press. Then
on July 20, 1936, I asked the Prime Minister whether he would receive a deputation of
Privy Councillors and a few others who would lay before him the facts so far as they knew
them. Lord Salisbury requested that a similar deputation from the House of Lords should
also come. This was agreed. Although I made personal appeals both to Mr. Atlee and Sir
Archibald Sinclair, the Labour and Liberal Parties declined to be represented. Accordingly on
July 28, we were received in the Prime Minister's House of Commons room by Mr. Baldwin,
Lord Halifax, and Sir Thomas Inskip. The following Conservative and non-party notables
came with me. Sir Austen Chamberlain introduced us.
THE DEPUTATION
This was a great occasion. I cannot recall anything like it in what I have seen of British
public life. The group of eminent men, with no thought of personal advantage, but whose
lives had been centred upon public affairs, represented a weight of Conservative opinion
which could not easily be disregarded. If the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Oppositions
had come with us, there might have been a political situation so tense as to enforce
remedial action. The proceedings occupied three or four hours on each of two successive
days. I have always said Mr. Baldwin was a good listener. He certainly seemed to listen
with the greatest interest and attention. With him were various members of the staff of the
House of Commons House of Lords
Sir Austen Chamberlain The Marquess of Salisbury
Mr. Churchill Viscount FitzAlan
Sir Robert Horne Viscount Trenchard
Mr. Amery Lord Lloyd
Sir John Gilmour Lord Milne
Captain Guest
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes
Earl Winterton
Sir Henry Croft
Sir Edward Grigg
Viscount Wolmer
Lieut.-Col. Moore-Brabazon
Sir Hugh O'Neill
174
Committee of Imperial Defence. On the first day I opened the case in a statement of an
hour and a quarter, of which some extracts, given in Appendix D, Book I, throw a fairly true
light on the scene.
I ended as follows:
First, we are facing the greatest danger and emergency of our history.
Secondly, we have no hope of solving our problem except in conjunction
with the French Republic. The union of the British Fleet and the French
Army, together with their combined air forces operating from close behind
the French and Belgian frontiers, together with all that Britain and France
stand for, constitutes a deterrent in which salvation may reside. Anyhow, it
is the best hope. Coming down to detail, we must lay aside every
impediment in raising our own strength. We cannot possibly provide against
all possible dangers. We must concentrate upon what is vital and take our
punishment elsewhere. Coming to still more definite propositions, we must
increase the development of our air power in priority over every other
consideration. At all costs we must draw the flower of our youth into piloting
airplanes. Never mind what inducements must be offered, we must draw
from every source, by every means. We must accelerate and simplify our
aeroplane production and push it to the largest scale, and not hesitate to
make contracts with the United States and elsewhere for the largest possible
quantities of aviation material and equipment of all kinds. We are in danger,
as we have never been in danger before? no, not even at the height of the
submarine campaign [1917 and
we were all three about to press it strongly upon your predecessor. It seems
a great pity to lose this valuable time. I have now upwards of six thousand
mines ready and moving forward in an endless flow? alas, only on land? and
of course there is always danger of secrecy being lost when delays occur.
I look forward to an early meeting of the Supreme Council, where I trust
concerted action may be arranged between French and English colleagues?
for that is what we are.
Mr. Churchill to M. Reynaud. March 22, 1940.
434
Pray give my kind regards to Mandel, and believe me, with the warmest
wishes for your success, in which our common safety is deeply involved.
The French Ministers came to London for a meeting of the Supreme War Council on March
28. Mr. Chamberlain opened with a full and clear description of the scene as he saw it. To
my great satisfaction he said his first proposal was that ?a certain operation, generally
known as the ??oyal Marine,' should be put into operation immediately.? He described
how this project would be carried out and stated that stocks had been accumulated for
effective and continuous execution. There would be complete surprise. The operation
would take place in that part of the Rhine used almost exclusively for military purposes. No
similar operation had ever been carried out before, nor had equipment previously been
designed capable of taking advantage of river conditions and working successfully against
the barrages and types of craft found in rivers. Finally, owing to the design of the weapon,
neutral waters would not be affected. The British anticipated that this attack would create
the utmost consternation and confusion. It was well known that no people were more
thorough than the Germans in preparation and planning; but equally no people could be
more completely upset when their plans miscarried. They could not improvise. Again, the
war had found the German railways in a precarious state, and therefore their dependence
on their inland waterways had increased. In addition to the floating mines, other weapons
had been designed to be dropped from aircraft in canals within Germany itself, where there
was no current. He urged that surprise depended upon speed. Secrecy would be
endangered by delay, and the river conditions were about to be particularly favourable. As
to German retaliation, if Germany thought it worth while to bomb French or British cities,
she would not wait for a pretext. Everything was ready. It was only necessary for the
French High Command to give the order.
He then said that Germany had two weaknesses: her supplies of iron ore and of oil. The
main sources of supply of these were situated at the opposite ends of Europe. The iron ore
came from the North. He unfolded with precision the case for intercepting the German ironore
supplies from Sweden. He dealt also with the Rumanian and Baku oilfields, which ought
to be denied to Germany, if possible by diplomacy. I listened to this powerful argument
with increasing pleasure. I had not realised how fully Mr. Chamberlain and I were agreed.
M. Reynaud spoke of the impact of German propaganda upon French morale. The German
radio blared each night that the Reich had no quarrel with France; that the origin of the
war was to be found in the blank cheque given by Britain to Poland; that France had been
dragged into war at the heels of the British; and even that she was not in a position to
sustain the struggle. Goebbels' policy towards France seemed to be to let the war run on at
the pres